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CONTENT MODERATION ISSUES ONLINE:
SECTION 230 IS NOT TO BLAME
Reese D. Bastian†
Abstract
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”)
is the glue that holds the Internet—as we know it today—together. Section 230 says, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”1 Simply put, Section
230 says that websites or platforms are not liable for content posted
by third parties.2 There are many critics who attribute the maladies of
the online world to Section 230. Section 230 presents issues such as
over-moderation by Interactive Computer Service (“ICS”) providers
that can go as far as to be considered censorship and under-moderation that leads to uncomely and even unsafe cyberspaces. Repealing
or weakening Section 230 will not fix over-moderation—or even under-moderation—online but allowing and fostering competition in the
tech sector will.
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1. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
2. Jess Miers, Section 230: What You Don’t Know Might Destroy the Internet,
YOUTUBE: TEDX TALKS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=7EGRRM_kMac&feature=youtu.be&t=585 [https://perma.cc/QH7V-XNBJ].
43

44

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 8

I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 44
II. BACKGROUND............................................................................... 47
A. Section 230: Shaping the Internet ..................................... 49
B. Problems Associated with Section 230 .............................. 52
1. Over-Moderation ......................................................... 52
2. Under-Moderation ....................................................... 53
III. THE TWO TYPES OF PROPOSITIONS TO “FIX” SECTION 230 ......... 54
A. Stripping Section 230 Protections ..................................... 55
1. Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship ..... 55
2. The Stop the Censorship Act ....................................... 57
3. Reform May Increase Private Governance .................. 59
B. Making Section 230 Operate Like Common Carriage ...... 62
IV. SECTION 230 IS NOT THE PROBLEM ............................................ 64
A. What is Good About Section 230?..................................... 64
B. How to “Fix” Section 230 Without Changing or
Weakening It........................................................................... 66
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 71
I. INTRODUCTION
Mass media of the twentieth century—print newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and television broadcasts—was very different
from the mass media of today.3 Mass media of the twentieth century
included forms of speech that were subject to a dualistic model of regulation, meaning that two actors were involved—the media company
and the government.4 The government regulated the speech of each
publishing house, movie house, newspaper, radio station, or television
station and governed them directly and individually, employing the
threat of fines, penalties, or imprisonment.5 Because these mass media
companies were editors and publishers of the content they provided,
they faced the broad liability that comes with being editors and publishers.6 Then, and even now, when a third party publishes speech or

3. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2013
(2018).
4. Id. at 2013.
5. Id. at 2013, 2015.
6. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1192
(2018).
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creates content, mass media companies are potentially subject to a
form of secondary liability known as intermediary liability. 7
The new “mass media outlets” came to be because of the Internet,
often taking the form of interactive social media platforms, where a
vast number of users (third parties) post their own content for others
to see. This arrangement is a triangle with three actors instead of two.8
Those three actors are governments, ICS providers, and third-party users.9 Big Tech ICS providers, such as Facebook, Google, YouTube,
and Twitter, have built Interactive Computer Services (“ICSs”) on a
cycle of content generation that relies on their millions of users to produce and provide content to all of their other users.10 Under the regulatory framework applied to traditional mass media of the twentieth
century, these ICS providers would be subject to intermediary liability
for all third-party content.11 In the United States, however, Section 230
limits intermediary liability for ICS providers.12 Before Section 230
was enacted, laws governing intermediary liability for ICS providers
were “hyper-vigilant” of those editing or moderating online speech of
third parties—meaning that any filtering or moderating of third-party
content by ICS providers would likely trigger liability—but upon passage of Section 230, the laws have transitioned into a “hyper-protective” phase where ICS providers are shielded from liability even when
they filter or moderate third-party content.13
For the past couple of decades, the sentiment has been that generally the Internet provides opportunities for free speech and promotes
the marketplace of ideas. However, in recent years that sentiment has
changed.14 There are many critics who attribute maladies of the online
world to Section 230. For example, on May 28, 2020, President Trump
issued an executive order titled: Executive Order on Preventing Online
Censorship (“Trump Executive Order”).15 That executive order states
7. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
8. Balkin, supra note 3, at 2055.
9. Id.
10. Balkin, supra note 6, at 1192; Balkin, supra note 3, at 2022.
11. See Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 at *5.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
13. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 (2009).
14. MIKE MASNICK, PROTOCOLS, NOT PLATFORMS 4 (2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/protocols-not-platforms-a-technological-approach-to-freespeech [https://perma.cc/9F9Z-D6ES].
15. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
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that “we cannot allow a limited number of online platforms to hand
pick the speech that Americans may access and convey on the internet.”16 The Trump Executive Order further alleges that social media
companies, like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, possess
the power to shape online content through censoring, deleting, and
controlling what information can and cannot be seen online.17 President Trump points to Section 230 as the source of this problem, however, tinkering with Section 230 may not be the best way to fix these
issues.
Repealing or drastically changing Section 230 is not the way to
fix content moderation and free speech issues online. There are essentially two categories of propositions to “fix” Section 230. The first
group of propositions essentially aims to strip Section 230 protections.
This is done, for example, by imposing duties of neutrality or obligations to take down certain third-party content in order for ICS providers to “earn” Section 230 protections. The second group of propositions focuses on common carriage solutions and tries to “fix” Section
230 with federal or other regulations that would make social media a
public utility.18 This Article argues that neither of these approaches
presents a viable way to resolve the many content moderation and free
speech issues that exist online. The better approach is to leave Section
230 as it is and combat anticompetitive issues by using antitrust law
and allowing and fostering competition against Big Tech in the ICS
sector.
Section II begins by describing Section 230, the development of
common law surrounding this legislation, and the different types of
problematic content moderation that arise under Section 230. Section
III examines, analyzes, and criticizes the categories of approaches to
“fix” Section 230 and specific propositions to substantially change or
repeal Section 230, such as the Trump Executive Order and the recently proposed Stop the Censorship Act, as well as proposals to reclassify certain Big tech ICSs as common carriers subject to non-discrimination regulation. Finally, Section IV describes the benefits of
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Bobby Allyn, Justice Clarence Thomas Takes Aim at Tech and Its Power
‘To Cut Off Speech,’ NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021
/04/05/984440891/justice-clarence-thomas-takes-aims-at-tech-and-its-power-to-cut
-off-speech [https://perma.cc/59HX-HZDD].
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Section 230, and argues that repealing or weakening Section 230 will
not fix over-moderation—or even under-moderation—online, but rather allowing and fostering competition against Big Tech in the ICS
sector through antirust and fundamental changes to the digital infrastructure of ICSs will fix the problem.
II. BACKGROUND
Ever since the creation of the World Wide Web, law and regulation have played major roles in shaping the Internet of today. In the
United States, companies like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and
YouTube possess the power to shape online content through censoring, deleting, and controlling what content can and cannot be seen
online.19 The services provided by Big Tech ICSs like Facebook and
Google are social media platforms used widely—seemingly, by everyone.20 Because of the network effect, bigger is better for these mega
platforms and this creates a sort of natural monopoly.21 The network
effect is the “well-known phenomenon that systems may quickly increase in value as the number of users grow, and similarly, that the
network may have little, or no, value without large scale adoption.”22
More users, on top of the millions already using these platforms, only
increases the value of the social networks, not only for the users, but
also the ICS providers.23 This is because they depend on collected data
from their huge mass of users to sell targeted ads to third parties.24
19. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,079; see also Adam Candeub,
Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage, Network Neutrality, and Section
230, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 391, 423 (2020).
20. See Sarah Joseph, Why the Business Model of Social Media Giants Like Facebook is Incompatible with Human Rights, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:59
PM), https://theconversation.com/why-the-business-model-of-social-media-giantslike-facebook-is-incompatible-with-human-rights-94016 [https://perma.cc/WB2B97F6].
21. John M. Yun, Does Antitrust Have Digital Blind Spots?, 72 S.C. L. REV. 305,
314–17 (2020); see also Sarah Joseph, Why the Business Model of Social Media
Giants Like Facebook is Incompatible with Human Rights, THE CONVERSATION
(Apr. 2, 2018, 3:59 PM), https://theconversation.com/why-the-business-model-ofsocial-media-giants-like-facebook-is-incompatible-with-human-rights-94016
[https://perma.cc/WB2B-97F6].
22. See Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV
. 1771, 1787 (2012).
23. See id. at 1788.
24. Sarah Joseph, Why the Business Model of Social Media Giants Like Facebook is Incompatible with Human Rights, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:59
PM), https://theconversation.com/why-the-business-model-of-social-media-giants-
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Because these mega platforms form monopolies, it is hard for users to
stop using their services because there are no viable alternatives.25
This has led to vast numbers of users on platforms such as Facebook
and Twitter—who each agree to the terms of service and are then governed by those terms as they use the platform to create and post their
own content. 26 Luckily for these platforms, Section 230 offers broad
immunity from intermediary liability when they moderate content and
places no obligations on the platforms in return.27 These platforms
have been free to moderate content in the way they think best, however, not everyone on these platforms agrees with the way content is
being moderated. Some want these platforms to enforce certain social
norms through targeted curation—and even censorship—of thirdparty content, while others are willing to part with their free-market
ideals in exchange for forced neutrality online in order to facilitate a
different version of social norms.28
Some argue that these ICSs are open to the public in such a way
that should allow people to assert their constitutional rights online.29
Because the Supreme Court has declared the Internet to be the modern-day public square,30 Internet users should not have to fear suppression of speech online by the government, but that says nothing about
suppression of speech online by ICS providers on their privately
owned platforms. Indeed, the government is not entirely in control of
what happens online. Because of Section 230, companies like Facebook have extensive control over what content they allow on their platform and have the power to discriminate against content they deem
inappropriate for their platform.31
like-facebook-is-incompatible-with-human-rights-94016 [https://perma.cc/WB2B97F6].
25. See Yun, supra note 21, at 314; see also Bobby Allyn, Justice Clarence
Thomas Takes Aim at Tech and Its Power ‘To Cut Off Speech,’ NAT’L. PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/05/984440891/justice-clarencethomas-takes-aims-at-tech-and-its-power-to-cut-off-speech [https://perma.cc/59HX
-HZDD]; MASNICK, supra note 14.
26. See Waller, supra note 22, at 1791.
27. See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:
Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 403 (2017).
28. See Nina Brown, Regulatory Goldilocks: Finding the Just and Right Fit for
Content Moderation on Social Platforms, 8 TEX. A&M L. REV. 451 (2021).
29. Tyler Lane, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Modern Public Square, 45
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 499 (2019).
30. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
31. Objectionable
Content,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com
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A. Section 230: Shaping the Internet
Section 230 is the glue that holds the Internet—as we know it
today—together. Its history is telling, and it started in the early days
of the Internet. Section 230 says, “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”32
Simply put, Section 230 says that websites or platforms are not liable
for content posted by third parties.33 Section 230 also provides ICS
providers with immunity from actions brought against them on account of restricting access to or availability of material posted by a
third party.34 Section 230 states:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of—any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.35
Thus, under Section 230, even though platforms may facilitate the
publication or distribution of third-party content, they are not considered editors or publishers of that content.36 ICS providers may also
restrict access to material posted by third parties and are not liable for
any actions brought against them on account of such restrictions.37
But how and why did the sweeping protection now offered by
Section 230 come to be? Before Section 230, laws governing intermediary liability for ICS providers were “hyper-vigilant” of those editing
and publishing the online speech of third parties, but upon the passage
of Section 230, and following case law development, the laws have
transitioned into a “hyper-protective” phase.38 During the “hyper-vigilant” stage of intermediary liability, before Section 230, when ICS
providers did filter and moderate some of the third-party content on
/communitystandards/objectionable_content [https://perma.cc/KT2H-CTS4].
32. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
33. Jess Miers, Section 230: What You Don’t Know Might Destroy the Internet,
YOUTUBE: TEDX TALKS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=7EGRRM_kMac&feature=youtu.be&t=585 [https://perma.cc/QH7V-XNBJ].
34. § 230(c)(2).
35. § 230(c)(2)(A).
36. § 230(c)(1).
37. § 230(c)(2).
38. Citron, supra note 13, at 116.
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their platforms, those ICS providers could be liable for all third-party
content posted onto their sites because they were considered editors
and publishers of all the third-party content on their platform.39
The passage of Section 230 responded to cases like Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. (“Prodigy”), where an ICS provider
was held liable for defamatory content published to its website by a
third party.40 The court in Prodigy reasoned that because Prodigy Services Co. exercised editorial discretion by algorithmically screening
for offensive language and manually deleting comments that were offensive or of bad taste, they acted as the editors and publishers of thirdparty content.41 The court held Prodigy Services Co. liable for defamation due to a defamatory statement posted by a user and entered a
judgment against them of 200 million dollars.42
This judgment caught the attention of lawmakers who felt that
legislation should be put in place that would allow ICS providers to
remove content that was objectionable without facing liability as editors and publishers.43 Legislators feared that the precedent of Prodigy,
which treated ICS providers as editors and publishers of third-party
content, would not lead to more accurate and thorough screening of
content online—but rather would lead to no screening at all.44 No
screening or moderation of third-party Internet content at all would
mean the Internet would be overflowing with exactly what Section 230
permits ICS providers to remove—“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” content.45
Essentially, under Prodigy, ICS providers faced the moderator’s
dilemma—either try to moderate perfectly and risk liability or do no
moderation at all and be free from liability.46 To avoid this dilemma,
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act was passed, and as
the original drafters intended, ICS providers could now selectively
39. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
40. Id.
41. Id. at *3–4.
42. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 169 (2016).
43. Citron & Wittes, supra note 27, at 405.
44. Id. (citing Citron, supra note 13, at 166 n.377).
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 230 — NURTURING INNOVATION OR
FOSTERING UNACCOUNTABILITY? 21 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331
/download [https://perma.cc/ZMK3-4QX6].
46. MARGARET JACKSON & MARITA SHELLY, LEGAL REGULATIONS,
IMPLICATIONS, AND ISSUES SURROUNDING DIGITAL DATA 70 (2020).
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filter out content that they did not want on their sites without being
liable for whatever else third parties posted to their sites.47
The protection given under Section 230 for “‘Good Samaritan’
blocking” was, in part, originally intended to encourage ICS providers
to keep their platforms free of harmful content inappropriate for minors.48 Section 230 did more than enable ICS providers to keep their
platforms free of undesirable content—it also ensured that the fledgling Internet companies of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries were not sued so much that they would cease to exist and—
perhaps—the Internet with them.49 This is still a vital function of Section 230 today as it allows for start-ups and new ICSs to develop without the threat of legal liability that could put them out of business.50
Just as it was intended to do, one year after its passage, in a seminal case, Section 230 effectively shielded AOL, an ICS provider,
from intermediary liability in a lawsuit brought against it by Ken Zeran.51 Zeran brought suit against AOL on account of defamatory content posted on its site, but because of Section 230, AOL no longer had
any secondary liability for defamatory content posted by a third
party.52 Over time many cases followed this precedent, giving rise to
the very broad protection from intermediary liability under Section
230.53 The “hyper-protective” broad protection for ICS providers we
have today is perhaps too overbroad.54
Since its passage, feelings towards Section 230 and its impact on
online freedom of speech have differed significantly and changed
along the way.55 To be sure, this trend will continue as laws and
47. Id. (quoting JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE
INTERNET 60 (2019)).
48. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
49. JACKSON & SHELLY, supra note 46, at 70 (quoting KOSSEFF, supra note 47,
at 60).
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 45, at 1.
51. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (Section 230
“creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”); see also
JACKSON & SHELLY, supra note 46, at 70.
52. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also JACKSON & SHELLY, supra note 46, at 70.
53. Citron & Wittes, supra note 27, at 409 (citing Ambika Doran & Tom Wyrwich, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Turns 20, LAW360 (Sept. 7,
2016, 12:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/836281/section-230-of-thecommunications-decency-act-turns-20 [https://perma.cc/QCU9-GEQ3]).
54. Id. at 403.
55. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in A Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 427, 434 (2009); see also Balkin, supra note 6, at 1194, 1209; Bobby Allyn,
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precedents surrounding Section 230 and intermediary liability continue to develop and change.
B. Problems Associated with Section 230
Because Big Tech companies have a monopoly over certain types
of services online, it is hard for users to stop using their services because there are no viable alternatives.56 This has led to vast numbers
of users on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter—and yet, many
are unhappy with the terms of service or how they are enforced.57
Many complain about over-moderation by ICS providers that target
certain viewpoints and borders censorship. Still, others protest undermoderation because it leads to uncomely and even unsafe cyberspaces.
1. Over-Moderation
Because so much communication and public discourse takes
place online by so many individuals and entities, ICSs have essentially
become modern-day public squares (spheres of public opinion)—but
in these public squares, there are private actors that have the power to
determine what people can and cannot say.58 Section 230 allows ICS
providers to block or remove third-party material “whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected.”59 ICS providers may choose to
over-moderate by censoring content for a variety of reasons, and this
leads to the loss of online freedom of speech for those whose speech
is regulated or censored by non-elected ICS providers.60 If governments as elected representatives are prohibited from exercising such
power over free speech, then un-elected private companies should
Justice Clarence Thomas Takes Aim at Tech and Its Power ‘To Cut Off Speech,’
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/05/984440891
/justice-clarence-thomas-takes-aims-at-tech-and-its-power-to-cut-off-speech [https:
//perma.cc/59HX-HZDD].
56. Sarah Joseph, Why the Business Model of Social Media Giants Like Facebook is Incompatible with Human Rights, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:59
PM), https://theconversation.com/why-the-business-model-of-social-media-giantslike-facebook-is-incompatible-with-human-rights-94016 [https://perma.cc/WB2B97F6]; see also MASNICK, supra note 14, at 29–29.
57. See MASNICK, supra note 14, at 7, 28–29.
58. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
60. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the
Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27, 61 (2019) (citing Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1358 (2018)).
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certainly not have such absolute power.61 When freedom of speech is
lost online, we also lose, to an extent, the valuable “public square” that
the Internet can be when unfettered by censorship.62
In the United States, the values of the First Amendment are as
important now as they ever have been.63 It is important to note that
even though First Amendment protections apply only to actions by the
state, there is still concern about the dramatic impact that private actors, such as social media sites, can have on the quantity and quality
of free speech in the United States. “The Supreme Court has noted that
social media sites . . . ‘can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.’”64
However, because of the freedom that ICS providers have to remove
third-party content, some believe that Section 230 poses a serious
threat to freedom of speech online.65 Even though the intent of Section
230 was to ensure “that companies that do some measure of blocking
are immunized for what they miss in § 230(c)(1) and are immunized
for the act of blocking itself in § 230(c)(2)”—it is clear that the immunity is much broader and can even allow for over-moderation.66
2. Under-Moderation
Just as a gardener tends to a garden to control weeds and promote
plant growth, under Section 230, ICS providers can and should tend to
their “virtual gardens” by moderating and filtering the speech posted
by third parties.67 Indeed, Section 230 was originally intended to encourage ICS providers to keep their platforms free of harmful content
inappropriate for minors.68 ICS providers are free to moderate and remove third-party content. ICS providers can misuse this freedom to
leave up or remove content.

61. See id.
62. Candeub, supra note 19, at 429.
63. Balkin, supra note 55, at 427–28.
64. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020) (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017)).
65. Id.
66. Citron & Wittes, supra note 27, at 408.
67. Jess Miers, Section 230: What You Don’t Know Might Destroy the Internet,
YOUTUBE: TEDX TALKS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=7EGRRM_kMac&feature=youtu.be&t=585 [https://perma.cc/QH7V-XNBJ].
68. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,079.
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The development of case law around Section 230 has made it so
that ICS providers are now broadly immunized from intermediary liability even when they have encouraged posting illegal content69 or enabled illegal activity by the way of their policies and website design.70
There have been hundreds of cases expanding the protection of Section 230 from intermediary liability for under-moderation and relatively very few minimizing it.71 Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin
Wittes put it well, saying that the “blanket immunity gives platforms
a license to solicit illegal activity. . . . Site operators have no reason to
take down material that is clearly defamatory or invasive of privacy.
They have no incentive to respond to clear instances of criminality or
tortious behavior.”72
It is important to understand that the broad immunity provided by
Section 230 does have statutory exceptions (some existing from the
time of Section 230’s birth and others added later), including criminal
law, intellectual property law, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, state laws that are consistent with Section 230, and the Allow
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”).73
Despite these exceptions, the protection offered by Section 230 is still
far-reaching.
III. THE TWO TYPES OF PROPOSITIONS TO “FIX” SECTION 230
There are essentially two types of propositions to “fix” Section
230. The first group of propositions tries to either limit the type of
content that ICS providers can take down or expand the type of content
that ICS providers must take down. The second group of propositions
focuses on making Section 230 more like a traditional common carriage arrangement by means of granting monopolies.74
69. Citron & Wittes, supra note 27, at 408 (citing Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp.
of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (N.Y. 2011); Phan v. Pham, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d
791, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)).
70. Citron & Wittes, supra note 27, at 408.
71. Id. at 409 (citing Ambika Doran & Tom Wyrwich, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Turns 20, LAW360 (Sept. 7, 2016, 12:27 PM), https:/
/www.law360.com/articles/836281/section-230-of-the-communications-decencyact-turns-20 [https://perma.cc/QCU9-GEQ3]).
72. Id. at 414.
73. JACKSON & SHELLY, supra note 46, at 70–71.
74. Elliot Harmon, Don’t Blame Section 230 for Big Tech’s Failures. Blame Big
Tech., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks
/2020/11/dont-blame-section-230-big-techs-failures-blame-big-tech [https://perma
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A. Stripping Section 230 Protections
People across the political spectrum have gripes about Section
230. However, one side argues that Section 230 allows over-moderation and the other that Section 230 inhibits moderation and leads to
under-moderation.75 Both President Joe Biden and President Donald
Trump have called to repeal Section 230.76 There have also been many
calls to reform Section 230 significantly.77
1. Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship
Because of the position that Section 230 allows over-moderation,
there are propositions to limit the amount of moderation that ICS providers are allowed to do. For example, President Trump recently issued the Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship, which addresses issues with Section 230 and argues that the law should not
grant ICS providers immunity when they choose to restrict access to
content that does not live up to the standard of “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”78 The problem is that “otherwise objectionable” is a broad
catchall phrase that Congress has yet to clarify.79 It has proven to be a
very low threshold, and changing that threshold would alter Section
230 drastically.
The Trump Executive Order calls for narrowing the content ICS
providers can remove without liability, citing that the original purpose
.cc/555G-YPW2].
75. Zhanna Malekos Smith, The Goldilocks Porridge Problem with Section 230,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.csis.org/blogs
/technology-policy-blog/goldilocks-porridge-problem-section-230 [https://perma
.cc/BG78-92F4].
76. Id.; see also Anshu Siripurapu, Trump and Section 230: What to Know,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (last updated Dec. 2, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr
.org/in-brief/trump-and-section-230-what-know [https://perma.cc/2TSZ-B33N].
77. Casey Newton, Everything You Need to Know About Section 230, THE
VERGE (Dec. 9, 2020, 4:50 PM), https://www.theverge.com/21273768/section-230explained-internet-speech-law-definition-guide-free-moderation [https://perma.cc
/3SE8-4NYF].
78. 47 U.S.C. § 230; Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28,
2020).
79. James Kachmar, Is Your Competitor Objectionable? The Scope of Immunity
Under the Communications Decency Act, WEINTRAUB TOBIN (Jan. 23, 2020), https:
//www.theiplawblog.com/2020/01/articles/ip/is-your-competitor-objectionable-thescope-of-immunity-under-the-communications-decency-act/
[https://perma.cc
/VY23-KUGD].
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of the “‘Good Samaritan’ blocking” protection under Section 230 was
to encourage ICS providers to keep their platforms free of harmful
content inappropriate for minors.80 It also suggests that the “good
faith” requirement under Section 230(c)(2)(a) should be a much higher
standard that must be met in order for ICS providers to qualify for
immunity from actions brought against them on account of restricting
access to material.81 These regulatory changes would change the way
ICS providers moderate but would not necessarily be the best thing to
fix moderation issues and protect freedom of speech online.82 As has
been shown by recent events, ICS providers do not need to remove
content to silence voices online because they can simply disable a
user’s account for posting or even ban a person from their platform.83
The changes made under the Trump Executive Order might prohibit
ICS providers from blocking or banning users, but this would simply
exacerbate issues associated with under-moderation as outlined below.
According to President Trump, when ICS providers censor content that they do not agree with, they are no longer passive facilitators
of online communication but rather online publishers and editors as
they were before the passage of Section 230.84 This approach might
lead to a situation that mirrors the state of the law as it was under
Prodigy—either try to moderate perfectly and risk liability, or do no
moderation at all and be free from liability. Many people who are
80. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,079; see also Hoeg Law, Section
230 Executive Order SIGNED! A Lawyer Re-Reviews Trump’s Plan (VL238),
YOUTUBE
(May.
28,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=gmBGFVUjCaI&t=631s [https://perma.cc/E3W7-4K6C].
81. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,079; see also Hoeg Law, Section
230 Executive Order SIGNED! A Lawyer Re-Reviews Trump’s Plan (VL238),
YOUTUBE
(May.
28,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=gmBGFVUjCaI&t=631s [https://perma.cc/E3W7-4K6C].
82. Elliot Harmon, Don’t Blame Section 230 for Big Tech’s Failures. Blame Big
Tech., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks
/2020/11/dont-blame-section-230-big-techs-failures-blame-big-tech [https://perma
.cc/555G-YPW2].
83. See Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER INC. (Jan. 8,
2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension [https:/
/perma.cc/8W5B-2X6G].
84. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,079. The Trump Executive Order
might lead to a situation mirroring the state of the law under Prodigy—either try to
moderate perfectly and risk liability or do no moderation at all and be free from
liability. However, Section 230 was passed to give ICS providers freedom to moderate as they see fit in order to create and curate internet spaces according to their
own taste.
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advocating for less content moderation and freedom of speech online
or who are criticizing existing law in order to fix content moderation
and promote free speech online are going about it in the wrong way.85
The Trump Executive Order calls to stop much of the moderation
that takes place online, and, in President Trump’s view, it would lead
to more speech and thus protect freedom of speech online.86 However,
more speech is not always better.87 Speech is protected because it is
vital to the democratic process and to the marketplace of ideas, “but
false speech can infect that marketplace and there is no reason to believe that truth will triumph . . . and it is fanciful to think that more
speech necessarily can undo the harms.”88
ICSs today use automated moderation via software as well as human moderators who both act on content that users flag.89 The Trump
Executive Order could restrict a lot of the content moderation that is
based on users flagging objectionable content or content that has not
been flagged but is simply objectionable. Examples of such content
are “nudity or pornography, insults or attacks based on religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, inappropriate or annoying content, content that is humiliating, or content that advocates violence to a person
or animal.”90 This would result in uncomely and unwelcoming internet
spaces.
2. The Stop the Censorship Act
The Stop the Censorship Act (the “Act”) also tries to narrow the
content that ICS providers are allowed to remove without facing intermediary liability, and, because of this, it presents some of the same
issues that the Trump Executive Order does.91 The Act, introduced to
the House of Representatives on July 25, 2019, suggests changing the

85. Elliot Harmon, Don’t Blame Section 230 for Big Tech’s Failures. Blame Big
Tech., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks
/2020/11/dont-blame-section-230-big-techs-failures-blame-big-tech [https://perma
.cc/555G-YPW2].
86. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,079.
87. Erwin Chemerinsky, False Speech and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2018).
88. Id.
89. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1637 (2018).
90. Id. at 1640.
91. Stop the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
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current language found in Section 230(c)(2)(A).92 Currently, Section
230 allows any good faith action by ICS providers to restrict access to
or availability of “material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable.”93 The change proposed would only allow
ICS providers to restrict access to or availability of “unlawful material.”94
This change in language would prohibit ICS providers from
blocking “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable content,”95 like spam or malware
because they are not illegal.96 It would also prohibit the removal of
“nudity or pornography, insults or attacks based on religion, ethnicity,
or sexual orientation, inappropriate or annoying content, content that
is humiliating, or content that advocates violence to a person or animal” as long as it is not illegal.97 Eric Goldman has said that this Act
should be properly named the “Censorship Act.”98 His criticism revolves around the fact that the Act would allow “spam, spyware, malware, and viruses” to go unmoderated.99 Further, he states that if ICS
providers were to actually change the way they moderate content due
to the Act, “they would be overrun by trollers, spammers, and miscreants, which would crowd out all productive conversations.”100
However, the proposed bill also seeks to create a new way for ICS
providers to moderate and filter content by allowing users to choose
filters that are personalized.101 Allowing ICS providers to take any action “to provide users with the option to restrict access to any other
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Mark Rasch, Can Antivirus Companies Use ‘Good Samaritan’ Defense to
Block Rival Software?, SEC. BOULEVARD (Dec. 6, 2019), https://securityboulevard
.com/2019/12/can-antivirus-companies-use-good-samaritan-defense-to-block-rival
-software/ [https://perma.cc/H3JM-RD2H].
97. See Stop the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019); Klonick, supra
note 89, at 1640.
98. Eric Goldman, Comments on Rep. Gosar’s “Stop the Censorship Act,” Another “Conservative” Attack on Section 230, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 15,
2019),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/08/comments-on-rep-gosarsstop-the-censorship-act-another-conservative-attack-on-section-230.htm
[https:/
/perma.cc/8VTR-UDTD].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Stop the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
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material, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected”
would accomplish this goal.102 The Act would permit each individual
(not the platform) to choose their own algorithm or filter.103 Even with
such filtering in place, the Act, like the Trump Executive Order, falls
short of “fixing” the Internet’s Section 230 woes, but perhaps for a
different reason—it still leaves Big Tech platforms with too much
power. The Act would do nothing to curtail the dominance of Big Tech
platforms and foster competition. Further, under the Act, Big Tech
platforms would have the discretion to create only certain filter options
for users to pick from, and there would certainly be people unsatisfied
with the filter options presented and the effects they would have on
content moderation.104
3. Reform May Increase Private Governance
Because so much power resides in the privately-owned platforms’
infrastructures, they can be used to govern speech online via content
moderation. These infrastructures allow policies to be implemented at
the “click of a button” can often be abused not only by those who own
them but by government actors seeking to co-opt their power.105
Because some believe that Section 230 inhibits moderation and
leads to under-moderation, they believe that the government should
take a more active role in determining what content ICS providers
should remove.106 Because ICS user bases rival the size of large countries, their terms of service and content moderation decisions begin to
seem a lot like government action.107 Indeed, sometimes, because of
private governance, this can actually be the case. Private governance
in the context of the Internet and ICS providers refers to the cooperation of ICS providers with governments and the government co-optation of ICS providers’ infrastructure to exercise control over nation102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See generally Elliot Harmon, Don’t Blame Section 230 for Big Tech’s Failures. Blame Big Tech., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.eff
.org/deeplinks/2020/11/dont-blame-section-230-big-techs-failures-blame-big-tech
[https://perma.cc/555G-YPW2].
105. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 2017.
106. Zhanna Malekos Smith, The Goldilocks Porridge Problem with Section 230,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.csis.org/blogs
/technology-policy-blog/goldilocks-porridge-problem-section-230 [https://perma
.cc/BG78-92F4].
107. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 2021.
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states by implementing and enforcing laws via the ICS providers’ infrastructure. “Cooperation and co-optation are particularly concerning
where they slide into ‘soft censorship’ or ‘jawboning’ by persuading
or pressuring platforms to adopt government’s favored limitations on
speech, because they limit the ability of the public to hold the government accountable for those limitations.”108 When the power to govern
online is so centralized in platforms, they are more susceptible to governments approaching them and telling them to “locate and block or
censor [a user], or else we will punish or fine you.”109 These decisions
are often opaque and made under the guise of ever-changing terms of
service.110 Even when not influenced by government action, ICS providers govern their platforms, but it is not a good idea to hold them to
government standards, such as the First Amendment.111
Mirko Hohmann and Alexander Pirang of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin point out that “setting the rules of the digital
public square, including the identification of what is lawful and what
is not, should not be left to private companies.”112 Likewise, private
companies should neither moderate nor censor under the guise of their
own terms of service when, in reality, they are carrying out governmental orders. Essentially, private governance comingles nation-state
and private powers and allows governments to avoid responsibility for
actions carried out via private governance.113 To better understand
what private governance looks like, it is helpful to look at some European Union (“EU”) laws.
In the EU, national governments, such as Germany, are now beginning to require the removal of illegal content or sometimes even
legal content that is simply offensive.114 This is a prime example of a
108. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 60, at 63.
109. Balkin, supra note 3, at 2017.
110. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 53 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
41, 78 (2020).
111. Balkin, supra note 3, at 2026 (“Even so, it is generally a bad idea to hold
social media spaces to the same standards as municipal governments under the First
Amendment. Imposing the same First Amendment doctrines that apply to municipalities to social media companies would quickly make these spaces far less valuable
to end users, if not wholly ungovernable.”).
112. Melissa Eddy & Mark Scott, Delete Hate Speech or Pay Up, Germany Tells
Social Media Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/06/30/business/germany-facebook-google-twitter.html
[https://perma.cc
/EJW3-BNNB].
113. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 60, at 30.
114. Brian Chang, From Internet Referral Units to International Agreements:
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piece of legislation that, if enacted in the United States, would weaken
Section 230 by expanding the type of content that ICS providers must
take down. This legislation in Germany is known as NetzDG, and
some believe that the government designed it to co-opt ICS providers
into enforcing legal standards and policies.115 The law requires providers of social networks (ICS providers) “to maintain an effective and
transparent procedure for handling complaints about unlawful content.”116 Upon receiving a complaint, the ICS provider must “remove[]
or block[] access to content that is manifestly unlawful within 24 hours
of receiving the complaint,” and all other unlawful content must be
removed or blocked “immediately, this generally being within 7 days
of receiving the complaint.”117 The government may fine ICS providers that do not comply by taking down potentially illegal, racist, or
slanderous content up to $57 million.118 Again, this can lead to overmoderation, and “speakers get no judicial determination of whether
their speech is legally protected or unprotected.”119
The main problem evident in the EU’s approach to intermediary
liability and the United States’ approach that calls for more government-mandated moderation is that it could lead to over-moderation.120
A law that requires ICS providers to make quick and precise legal
judgments will likely cause ICS providers to err on the side of caution
by granting take-down requests that may have little or no merit.121 This
is because ICS providers need to be sure they do not leave up content
that could result in a fine if they make the wrong decision.122 The
Censorship of the Internet by the UK and EU, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 114,
118 (2018).
115. Balkin, supra note 3, at 2030.
116. Netzdurchsetzunggesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Oct. 1,
2017, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] at 61 2017 VI p. 3352, § 3(1) (Ger.). See also Network Enforcement Act (Netzdurchsetzunggesetz, [NetzDG]), Ger. L. Archive (Jan.
26, 2018), https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=1245 [https://perma.cc/4UQU
-E87T].
117. Id. at § 3(2), para. 2–3.
118. Melissa Eddy & Mark Scott, Delete Hate Speech or Pay Up, Germany Tells
Social Media Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/06/30/business/germany-facebook-google-twitter.html
[https://perma.cc
/EJW3-BNNB].
119. Balkin, supra note 3, at 2031.
120. Id. at 2017–18.
121. Id.; see Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious
Approach, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 225 (2018).
122. Balkin, supra note 3, at 2013, 2018; Melissa Eddy & Mark Scott, Delete
Hate Speech or Pay Up, Germany Tells Social Media Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June
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resources and time needed to make an accurate legal determination for
each complaint are great. Thus, ICS providers might wisely choose to
not spend the time and resources to try to make the correct legal determination and instead just grant the requests.123 Thus, the choice to employ strict laws that hold ICS providers liable for certain third-party
content may lead to more over-moderation,124 much like the Trump
Executive Order and the Stop the Censorship Act.
In the EU, there have been some calls for reform of intermediary
liability law. In contrast to the United States, where the law seeks to
shield ICS providers, in the EU, “there has already been significant
movement at the level of member states,” where the states have moved
towards punishing ICS providers rather than protecting them.125 EU
Justice Commissioner Vera Jourová said that she is not yet ready to
propose EU-wide legislation, but she has stated that measures will
need to be taken if individual member states do not self-regulate as
Germany has.126
B. Making Section 230 Operate Like Common Carriage
Some are proponents of making Section 230 more like traditional
common carriage arrangements by granting monopolies to ICS providers and imposing more liability on them.127 Some politicians have
proposed making social media a public utility.128 In the past, when it
did not make sense logistically (because of limited bandwidth) to have
many small communications firms, the United States government
struck “regulatory deals” with certain firms that made them legal

30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/business/germany-facebookgoogle-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/EJW3-BNNB].
123. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 2018–19.
124. Id. at 2018–19, 2027.
125. David Morar & Bruna Martins dos Santos, Online Content Moderation Lessons from Outside the US, BROOKINGS (June 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu
/blog/techtank/2020/06/17/online-content-moderation-lessons-from-outside-the-u-s
/ [https://perma.cc/4D73-UM7X].
126. Chang, supra note 114, at 118.
127. Elliot Harmon, Don’t Blame Section 230 for Big Tech’s Failures. Blame Big
Tech., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks
/2020/11/dont-blame-section-230-big-techs-failures-blame-big-tech [https://perma
.cc/555G-YPW2].
128. See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big
-tech-9ad9e0da324c [https://perma.cc/HFE6-2JF7].
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monopolies.129 The government was willing to make exemptions to
laws against monopolies because the firms agreed to terms that would
benefit society.130 These terms that the firms committed to in return
for the government-granted monopolies often included adopting nondiscriminatory policies, servicing unprofitable markets, and taking on
extra liability.131 Adam Candeub points out that “Unlike telegraph and
telephone companies, Facebook and Google to this day have no obligations to refrain from discrimination, carry all lawful messages, or
provide any public good—even though they function as the dominant
communications of their time.”132 However, companies like Facebook
and Google should not be empowered to become “common carriage”
monopolies.
Section 230 does look a lot like a “regulatory deal” where ICS
providers are given a big legal break because they do not face secondary liability for third-party content even though they moderate some
of that content.133 However, Section 230 places no commitment on
ICS providers—they do not have to do anything to “earn” Section
230’s protections,134 and that is how it should stay. ICSs should not
become common carriage arrangements or public utilities because
Section 230 is not amenable to common carriage arrangements and
there are other ways to “regulate around” content moderation issues
online.135 Even though Section 230’s “Good Samaritan provision is
not quite the antithesis of a must-carry rule, it is a rather broad license
to engage in the kind of content-based discrimination that is prohibited
of common carriers,”136 thus making Section 230 not very amenable
to common carriage adaptations at all. Supporters of common carriage
online “and ‘platform neutrality’ appeal to notions of regulatory equity
and symmetry.”137 They argue that what may be good at a network
provider level is good at the ICS provider level.138 But “they fail to
recognize . . . that personalization—i.e., content discrimination—is
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Candeub, supra note 19, at 407.
Id.
Id. at 396, 408, 412–13.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
See generally MASNICK, supra note 14.
Bridy, supra note 121, at 209.
Id. at 227.
Id.
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central, not merely incidental, to the design of social media platforms.”139 Further, these ICS monopolies have not formed with government authorization or intervention, but rather they have naturally
formed due to the network effect.140
If the United States government made a “regulatory deal” with
ICS providers and created an artificial monopoly, it could potentially
stifle the free flow of ideas and innovation online. This is based on the
idea that the “regulatory deal” would impose anti-discrimination
standards on ICS providers, and, as Eric Goldman has argued, with
every legislative “reigning in” of Section 230’s broad-reaching immunity, Section 230 loses its power to protect freedom of expression
online.141 Further, because monopolies are anti-competitive by definition, this arrangement would not allow for competitors to innovate and
offer better social platforms. Additionally, a “regulatory deal” in the
form of common carriage obligations for Big Tech would give even
more power to the already too-powerful Big Tech companies. It would
also put the government and Big Tech in a dangerously close relationship that could lead to abuses, like private governance, as discussed in
the previous section.142
IV. SECTION 230 IS NOT THE PROBLEM
A. What is Good About Section 230?
Though there are problems with content moderation and free
speech online, repealing or drastically changing Section 230 is not the
solution to those problems. In fact, Section 230 actually bolsters the
freedom of speech protections given by the First Amendment and adds
procedural, as well as substantive, benefits to the freedom of speech
protections provided by the First Amendment.143
First, Section 230 is a procedural tool that allows courts to dismiss
lawsuits early on, avoiding costly First Amendment litigation because
the prima facie case for Section 230 is much easier to prove than a

139. Id.
140. Candeub, supra note 19, at 422; Yun, supra note 21, at 314–17.
141. Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33, 34 (2019).
142. See generally Bloch-Wehba, supra note 60, at 30, 63.
143. Goldman, supra note 141, at 34.
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prima facie case for the First Amendment.144 Section 230 does not
harm free speech—it enhances it. It allows ICS providers to not be
overly wary of what might happen to them if they do not control what
third-parties post on their sites and that allows more speech to be
posted.145 If Section 230 gets repealed, it is very uncertain how courts
would interpret the First Amendment under facts that would have been
easily and quickly dismissed under Section 230.146
Critics of Section 230, such as President Trump, point to the Big Tech
companies like Facebook and Twitter as examples of what is wrong
with Section 230. Big Tech moderates the content posted to their sites
based on their own terms of service and relevant laws. Big Tech has a
lot of resources to overcome whatever obstacles are put in their way.
A repeal or rethinking of Section 230 might just cement Big Tech even
more in their position of power because the protection offered by Section 230 actually ensures that start-up ICS companies are not sued so
much that they go out of business.147
The main problem evident in taking immunity away from ICS
providers is that, in order to comply with the law, ICS providers will
likely err on the side of caution and grant take-down requests that may
have little or no merit, leading to less speech.148 On the other hand, it
may make the internet a place teeming with “trollers, spammers, and
miscreants” whose speech drowns out the free speech of others.149 Either way, these content moderation issues lead to less free speech
online if handled incorrectly. Section 230, as it is, promotes competition among ICSs. Because all ICS providers receive its protection,
even small start-ups benefit from the protections that keep them out of
lawsuits that could make them go out of business.150 Reigning in

144. Id. at 35.
145. Id.
146. Anshu Siripurapu, Trump and Section 230: What to Know, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (last updated Dec. 2, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief
/trump-and-section-230-what-know [https://perma.cc/2TSZ-B33N].
147. JACKSON & SHELLY, supra note 46, at 70 (quoting KOSSEFF, supra note 47,
at 60); see also Harmon, supra note 74.
148. See Bridy, supra note 121, at 225.
149. Goldman, supra note 98.
150. Jennifer Huddleston, Section 230 as a Pro-Competition Policy, AM. ACTION
F. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/section-230-as-apro-competition-policy/ [https://perma.cc/A24P-XPYS].
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Section 230 could stifle the competition that comes from smaller and
newer ICS providers.151
B. How to “Fix” Section 230 Without Changing or Weakening It
Efforts would be better spent trying to allow for more competition
amongst ICS providers. ICS providers like Facebook, Google, and
Twitter require the attention of many users to be able to compete and
dominate the market.152 To be able to avoid the issues of over-moderation, under-moderation, and private governance, users of ICSs should
have more options. There should be more competition that drives ICS
providers to use moderate content in ways that users approve of—this
is actually what Section 230 was meant for.153
The amount of power that ICS providers like Facebook and Twitter have is astounding, bordering on monopolistic control.154 Instead
of focusing on the perceived shortcomings of Section 230, reform
should focus on what Section 230 does well and, in turn, focus on different solutions to resolve free speech problems online. Because calls
for Section 230 reform come for different reasons from either side of
the political spectrum,155 it is important that the solution is comprehensive in addressing content moderation and free speech problems
online. If politicians’ constituencies were happy with content moderation online, there would not be so much political uproar and commentary about Section 230.156 So, to fix the problem, instead of reforming or repealing Section 230, it should be left as it is, and the focus
should be on fighting the monopolistic nature of Big Tech companies
with antitrust law and fostering competition amongst ICSs. Antitrust
action along with fundamental changes to ICSs’ digital infrastructures
could solve many content-moderation and free speech issues online.
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152. Keith N. Hylton, Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law, 98 NEB. L. REV. 272,
273 (2019).
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Antitrust action by the government could be successful in limiting
anticompetitive acquisitions and providing more competition, diversity, and innovation, leading to more ICS companies instead of only a
few massive ones.157 However, there are some who question whether
existing antitrust law would work for ICSs.158 Even if existing antitrust
laws worked to perfection, it would still mean losing the value of big
ICSs’ networks and the network effects. Further, breaking up Big Tech
ICSs does not guarantee that content moderation practices affecting
free speech online would never arise again.159 Companies like Google,
Facebook, and Twitter are not like traditional monopolies that gain
100% market control and then raise prices.160 In fact, these companies
often do not charge anything for their “services” and instead collect
data about their users to sell targeted advertising to third parties.161
There are many concerns about Big Tech’s consumer privacy practices, in addition to concerns about content moderation and free speech
online. 162 So, breaking up companies like Facebook or Google that
are not committing traditional monopoly offenses would not necessarily do away with consumer privacy concerns or content moderation
and free speech issues online.163 It may make the problems go away
temporarily, just for them to surface again later on new platforms.
Mike Masnick in his 2019 article suggested a novel solution to
cure the ills plaguing content moderation and free speech online that
could work in conjunction with antitrust measures or even on its
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own.164 His solution: “[B]uild protocols not platforms.”165 In years
past, the internet operated using many different protocols.166 One that
still prevails today is Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (“SMTP”), which
is used for email.167 Have you ever wondered why you can email
someone who uses a different email service without any issues, and all
the while it is not possible to message someone on Twitter via Facebook? Essentially it is because Facebook and Twitter are privately
owned platforms and not public protocols.168
Protocols would offer many advantages that platforms do not of169
fer. Take Twitter, for example. Twitter is one-of-a-kind, and there
are no other services with the size and popularity of Twitter that behave exactly like Twitter does. However, recently, an ICS provider
whose platform was very similar to Twitter, called Parler, somewhat
anticipated that many users of the most prevalent ICSs would be unsatisfied with the moderation on those platforms. To this end, in 2018,
Parler was launched and marketed as “Twitter” without the “censorship.”170 It boasted many of the same features as Twitter, but because
of perceived unfairness in moderation towards conservatives, many
people dissatisfied with Twitter opened Parler accounts.171 Most of
those accounts opened in the days and weeks surrounding the 2020
presidential election.172
Soon after the election, Google, Apple, and Amazon put an end
to Parler’s short lived surge of popularity by removing it from the
Google and Apple app stores and booting it off of Amazon Web Services.173 Google and Apple suspended Parler from their respective app
stores because Parler was “allowing too many [posts] that encouraged
violence and crime.”174 While Amazon removed Parler from its web
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services because it “repeated[ly] violat[ed] . . . Amazon’s rules.”175
Parler demonstrated the many problems with extremely lax moderation standards, and this caused its demise.176 Clearly, both over-moderation and under-moderation affect free speech online. So, what will
it take to arrive at the perfect balance? Perhaps antitrust law alone
could resolve these issues,177 but in breaking up Big Tech’s ICSs, the
value of their massive networks is lost. A significant change to the
digital infrastructure of the internet could be just as effective and even
work in conjunction with antitrust law to conserve the valuable network effects.
In the case of Parler and Twitter, both are privately owned infrastructures or platforms. So, with protocols, “rather than relying on a
few giant platforms to police speech online, there could be widespread
competition, in which anyone could design their own interfaces, filters, and additional services, allowing whichever ones work best to
succeed, without having to resort to outright censorship for certain
voices.”178 Using protocols widely would mean that services of the
same protocol would be compatible with others of the same protocol
but with unique filters and features.179 For example, Gmail and Protonmail offer different features, but at their core, they are both email
services that are interoperable.180 Protocols allow ICSs to offer the advantages of network effects by allowing access to big networks because services that operate on the same protocol are interoperable and
no implementation of a protocol would be isolated to only its own users.181 A shift to “social media protocols” could drive innovation for
healthy content moderation practices and promote competition to create the service with the best content moderation online.182
Further, the resurgence of protocols on the internet could “allow
end users to determine their own tolerances for different types of
speech but make it much easier for most people to avoid the most
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See generally Hylton, supra note 152.
178. MASNICK, supra note 14.
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problematic speech, without silencing anyone entirely or having the
platforms themselves make the decisions about who is allowed to
speak.”183 The essence of the problem with content moderation and
free speech online is that any decision made by a platform is going to
upset someone. Platforms have two choices: remove disputed content
and make someone angry, or do not remove disputed content and make
someone else angry.184 For whatever reason it may be that a user of an
ICS is angry, they often have no other meaningful alternative to the
platform.185 For example, because of Facebook’s dominant market position, “the extent that users feel beholden to Facebook . . . is not because the company offers them especially skillful services or judgments so much as because of a lack of viable alternatives.”186
Meaning, a user who walks away from Facebook loses the entire Facebook network and cannot easily replace it with another service.
For example, referring back to the email example referenced
above, if an email service fails or a user wishes to find a different service, there is an underlying email protocol that a new email service
could be built on with relative speed and ease. This new email service
could offer some of the same features and benefits of its failed predecessor while also offering improvements. Because it would be built on
the same protocol as other email services, it would be interoperable
with all other email service implementations. This would make it relatively easy for users to move to the new service and retain the benefits
of the network effects.
Because Twitter and Parler are each separate platforms not based
on a common protocol, when the Twitter wannabe, Parler, failed, there
were no like alternatives to Parler. If there had been an underlying
“Twitter protocol,” there would have already been many “Twitter protocol implementations” long before January 6, 2021. This would have
allowed users to choose whatever implementation of the “Twitter protocol” they preferred. That implementation would offer them content
moderation practices that they agreed with while giving them access
to the entire user base of the “Twitter protocol.” Had this been the
case, the content moderation preferences of many of those who left
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
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Twitter for Parler would have been available and the need for a wellpoliced ICS mostly free of violence and crime would have been met.
The key is that, in an online world dominated by protocols, there
would be an array of protocols modeling the many types of platforms
that now exist, but there would be “many competing interface implementations” built on each protocol to satisfy many different preferences and needs.187
Building on top of the already existing protocols would be faster
and easier than building an entirely new Facebook or Twitter.188 It
would allow for access to the entire user base of any given protocol
and make switching between interface implementations built on the
same protocol relatively easy.189 The result is a competitive and innovative environment online that allows for our best thinkers to step in
and re-imagine content moderation and free speech online,190 while
letting Section 230 do what it does best. The result of an online world
dominated by protocols would be very similar to what the Stop the
Censorship Act tries to accomplish but would keep Section 230 intact,
decentralize the monopolistic power of Big Tech ICSs, and preserve
the valuable network effects.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 230 provides that ICS providers will not be liable for “any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability” to third-party content, “whether or not such material is constitutionally protected,”191 and it should stay that way. Courts have recently
thrown out the notion that the Internet is a public square,192 and Section 230 does its part to regulate these private Internet spaces.193 So
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what is broken about the Internet? It is not Section 230, and if it is not
broken, do not fix it.
There is no simple solution to fix the challenges of over-moderation or under-moderation online that lead to content moderation and
free speech issues.194 Repealing or weakening Section 230 will not fix
over-moderation—or even under-moderation—online, however, allowing and fostering competition against Big Tech in the ICS sector
in the right way and using the right tools can. Existing antitrust laws
combined with a fundamental change to the digital infrastructure of
the Internet by switching to a more protocol-oriented Internet are good
places to start.
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